, terrorists committed several attacks in Saint-Denis and the East Parisian districts. These attacks, claimed by the organization Islamic State, constitute the deadliest series of multisite attacks that France has experienced. The stake for the Etablissement Franc ßais du Sang (EFS, the French public blood service) was to face the shockwave that propagated throughout the whole establishment from the very minutes following the events, impacting all the processes and stakeholders involved in the transfusion chain, which were challenged by a massive blood donor influx as soon as 14 November 2015. This article covers the impacts of the attacks on immunohaematology and delivery activities as well as the actions that were implemented to ensure sufficient blood supply. Then, the impacts on blood component production are set out. EFS integrated organization and available stocks allowed meeting blood requirements and enabled a strong control of outdating, after unprecedented blood collections during the weeks following 13 November 2015. Lastly, the article presents EFS experience feedback of Paris attacks and of the event that occurred in Nice on 14 July 2016, which helped improve our crisis management pattern with:
Introduction
On 13 November 2015, in the Paris district (Ile-de-France region), then on 14 July 2016, in Nice, France faced a series of terrorist attacks.
In Saint-Denis and Paris, there were co-ordinated attacks under the form of suicide bombings and mass shootings, with a final death toll reaching 134 and 356 casualties.
These were the deadliest attacks in France since World War 2 and the deadliest in the European Union since Madrid train bombings (2004) . On 14 July 2016, in Nice, a lorry struck a crowd attending a fireworks show in honour of Bastille Day, killing 84 persons.
Business continuity in a context of war scenes and strong tensions for hospitals [1] was an important issue, as was the management of the massive influx of donors who spontaneously came to donate blood at our blood drives.
This article presents the way in which the Etablissement Franc ßais du Sang (EFS), the French public civilian blood service -the Army blood centre (CTSA) being in charge of military operations -dealt with these events, and the subsequent lessons learned. Feedback of Paris event helped develop measures that were activated in the framework of the Euro 2016 football championship and after the attack in Nice.
EFS crisis organization
EFS is the only French civilian establishment empowered to collect, produce and deliver blood products (BPs).
Our organization is distinctive from the blood organizations traditionally encountered as our activities cover the whole blood transfusion chain, from donors to recipients. We insure 80% of immunohaematology testing activities and nominative delivery of BPs.
This organization presents a double advantage as internal exchange mechanisms are set up to guarantee that the necessary BPs are continuously available to cover patients' needs nationwide. In addition, our unified structure, coupled with a control of delivery processes, permits reaching virtually zero levels of outdating.
EFS is composed of 15 regional blood centres, supervised by La Plaine Saint-Denis headquarters [2] .
The Executive Officer who is on standby is kept informed of any significant events that have or may have an impact on the institution's activities. He identifies serious events that could justify reinforced monitoring or actual crisis situations.
When warranted, a crisis unit is activated to respond to 'abnormal' situations facing the institution.
The unit is responsible for implementing business continuity plans for identified events or defining the most appropriate responses to new situations, the nature or scale of which exceed the scope of existing plans.
Under EFS Chief Executive Officer's authority, the crisis unit is responsible for co-ordinating the local blood centres' involvement and actions related to BP production and supply to hospitals, internal or external communication and blood donors and employees' safety. This last issue emerged strongly on the day following the attack, when a large numbers of donors were queuing at most of our blood collection sites and the authorities feared other potential attacks.
In a crisis situation, the CEO appoints an operational director in charge of leading the crisis unit, which is composed of four divisions: (1) Decision-making; (2) Situation appraisal and organization; (3) Communication; (4) Expertise and guidance.
The CEO also makes strategic decisions and interfaces with the French authorities.
Implementation of the crisis organization after 13 November 2015 events
It was 9:20 pm when a suicide bomber blew himself up at the Stade de France, followed at 9:25 pm by the first shootings at two restaurants: the Carillon and the Petit Cambodge, in the 10th arrondissement of Paris.
The second explosion happened at 9:30 pm at the Stade de France, where a friendly football match between France and Germany was played. Three terrorists exploded in what represented the first suicide bombings in France.
Then, between 9:30 pm and 9:36 pm, terrorist commandos attacked two brewery bars (La Bonne Bi ere and La Belle Equipe), in the 11th arrondissement.
At 9:40 pm, an attack and hostage-taking occurred at the Bataclan concert hall, where 1500 people were attending a concert of the American rock band Eagles of Death Metal: three jihadists opened fire on the public, before security forces neutralized the terrorists; and an explosion took place at the Comptoir Voltaire caf e, again in the 11th arrondissement.
The third explosion was heard at the Stade de France at 9:53 pm.
There was virtually no progressivity in the surge of EFS crisis mechanisms. The first warnings arrived simultaneously from two hospitals located near the Parisian sites of BP delivery at 9:45 pm. At 10:00 pm, EFS Ile-deFrance regional director, after initial assessment of blood needs and potential supply concerns, alerted EFS CEO who immediately launched a national crisis unit. At 10:30 pm, the first analyses made it possible to identify critical points and to assess availability of BP stocks. At 11:15 pm, the first blood regulations were initiated at Saint-Denis, Lariboisi ere and Saint-Louis hospitals, as the first logistical problems appeared: some districts were closed by the police.
The national crisis unit made first contact with the CORRUS (health and social reception and regulation centre of the Ministry of Health), which was activated into a health crisis centre at 10:00 pm.
Blood transfusion management for the injured
Managing such a situation is characterized by the uncertainty surrounding it: the duration of the event, hospitals likely to accommodate the injured and number of casualties were unknown, as were also the needs for BPs.
As a result of attacks near Saint-Louis hospital, many wounded persons went to the emergency service on their own. Their spontaneous influx into hospitals that are not supposed to be on the front line required rapid adaptation of our blood stocks. This requirement for adaptability must be at the heart of crisis management organizations.
In this uncertain context, while our blood reserve is positioned in Ile-de-France, a process of cascade replenishment was quickly decided to increase blood stocks in the hospitals that were facing an influx of wounded patients. Their distribution in the Ile-de-France hospitals is presented in the publication by Hirsh et al. [1] . Dispatch centres supplied the hospitals placed under their jurisdiction. Blood transfers were also made between dispatch centres, depending on the demands made to each or the other.
EFS Ile-de-France blood centre manages 25 delivery facilities, six of which are also dispatch centres. The map in Fig. 1 shows their location in Paris and its inner suburbs.
On the morning of 13 November 2015, the Ile-deFrance red blood cell (RBC) stocks amounted to 5160 units and the platelet stocks equalled 96 components. During the week of 13 November 2015, the stock of fresh-frozen plasma (FFP) in Ile-de-France was 3187 units.
The overall BP inventory status at the time of the event is presented in Tables 1-3 .
These stock levels should be considered in the light of the need for BPs resulting from the attacks. As described in Table 4 , only 510 products (286 units of RBC, 199 units of FFP and 25 PCs) were actually used for the 59 patients who were transfused on 13 November and 14 November 2015, confirming feedbacks from past mass casualty events that demonstrate that the need for blood is generally low after such tragedies.
Blood product ratios per patient were 4Á8 RBCs, 3Á4 FFPs and 0Á4 PCs. These ratios, which are close to those described in the literature [3] , vary slightly depending on the type of event, as 63 RBCs, 31 FFPs and 7 PCs were transfused to 17 patients after Nice attack, as shown in Table 5 . The needs were was also low, in relation to the stocks of BP available at this blood centre.
In the context of vital emergencies, while access to blood typing results was lacking, selection of RBCs for patients' transfusion was performed in accordance with the guidelines of the National High Authority for Health (Haute Autorit e de Sant e -HAS) [4] Thanks to the stocks that were 'normally' available and to blood replenishment operations at the very beginning of the attacks, EFS was able to cope with the events.
However, beyond the availability of products, blood supply in crisis situation requires rigorous patient identification management. Although we were able to supply blood in optimal safety conditions, achieving a robust temporary identity management system was imperious to avoid that a same patient could have several medical files according to transfers made between hospitals. The feedback after Nice attack also confirmed this argument. To circumvent the issue, blood products with a broad compatibility spectrum (O group RBC and AB group plasma) were distributed when in doubt. We are also working to harmonize temporary identification and record procedures with hospitals.
Prioritization of biological testing requests to allow quick availability of the results for first-priority patients is another essential issue. In the context of Paris crisis, all requests were sent to immunohaematology (IH) laboratories without being prioritized. The interface between emergency services and our IH laboratories will be improved, to better identify priority requests.
Finally, emergency blood supply demands that the teams are sufficiently sized to deal with the significant increase in activity. The spontaneous mobilization of EFS employees allowed strengthening the teams.
Feedback of Paris and Nice events allowed learning three important lessons on HR management in a crisis context: spontaneous mobilization must be channelled to keep employees at rest who will have to be mobilized at a later stage; the teams that are mobilized in the early hours must be placed at rest for several days, at the end of the working period; moreover, IH and delivery teams must be 'isolated from what is happening outside' to remain focused on their activities.
Action to be taken should also be explained in a calm and collected manner to avoid any tensions between employees who take part in the crisis management and other personnel.
In parallel, and to improve efficiency and serenity, and while we must permanently face high terrorist threat levels, EFS has decided to develop a training module on the management of IH and delivery activities during a massive BP demand, within a short and uncertain time.
Impact of the attacks regarding selfsufficiency
EFS must ensure self-sufficiency in BPs in France. From this standpoint, nationwide target inventory levels were set at 12-day RBC stocks [5] that comprise the in-process inventory (products already collected but not yet 'released'), that is approximately 1Á5 or 2 days of stock. FFP target stocks are also fixed, with a minimum 12-week safety inventory. RBC stocks are expressed in number of units* or number of days** (assessed on the basis of the average demand for each phenotype). Platelet stocks are expressed in number of components. The indicator related to platelet component (PC) stock coverage is still under construction; the low life expectancy of this product led us to define minimum PC thresholds to be met by each local blood centre.
The overall BP stocks were sufficient to cover the patients' needs. The main challenge, however, was allowing shuttles to be relocated in order to replenish hospital stocks according to the influx of the injured. In such, logistics is an essential issue. Enabling our vehicles to move in a context of chaos engendered by the multisite attacks in Paris was an important challenge. Besides, some neighbourhoods were closed by law enforcement. Blood replenishment was possible thanks to the use of motorcycles and of a police escort.
Two important factors had to be taken into account at the outset of the attacks in Ile-de-France: the need to anticipate blood needs while 'being in the fog' and the impact of public security measures on collection activities, and consequently on platelet stocks.
The confusion associated with the nature and extent of these measures generated great concern about our collection capacity, particularly in Paris and its suburbs. Moreover, access to one of the main apheresis platelet collection sites in Paris (Saint-Louis, located just opposite two of the bars that were hit by the attacks) was uncertain.
In these conditions -and Ile-de-France delivering one quarter of the total amount of platelets used in France, the national crisis unit organized a preventive replenishment of the region's blood stocks from other metropolitan blood centres, to anticipate a significant decline in the ability to collect apheresis platelets on November 14.
Effective transfusion management is essential to reduce mortality risks among the injured [6] . EFS priority remains to anticipate transfusion needs in a crisis context, by maintaining adequate levels of BP stocks and effective national BP regulation, better integrating our institution into the crisis cells set up by local authorities and re-evaluating BP requirements, hospitalby-hospital, on the basis of the emergency services' assessment of the flow of casualties that can be cared for after major events.
A massive influx of blood donors
From the morning of Saturday November 14, and throughout the following week, there was an exceptional attendance of blood donors at our blood venues in mainland France, particularly in Ile-de-France where it was perceptible during 4 weeks.
The following indicators reflect the blood donor community's mobilization:
(1) 45 172 bags of whole blood were collected during the week when the attacks happened (W46), while collection forecasts for that same week average around 37 500 bags; as the events occurred on a Friday evening, the increase in activity was mainly concentrated on Saturday 14 November 2015 (and, to a lesser extent, Sunday 15 November); (2) 77 288 whole blood donations were made during the subsequent week (W47), 20% of which were made by first-time donors. This outstanding mobilization reflects solidarity movements observed after similar mass casualty events worldwide, such as the 11 September 2001 tragedy [7] [8] [9] [10] . Figure 2 (a,b) presents blood collection in donation centres and mobile drives during the weeks following Paris attacks.
The events impacted mainly whole blood donation, then plasma donation, apheresis platelet donation being strictly organized according to the needs.
In the week after the attacks (W47), blood collection increased by almost 55%, compared with the volume collected in normal situation. While all venues were concerned, blood collection at donation centres was twice the volume collected in normal situations. The increase was still around 9% in W49.
Blood donation during the days following 13 November 2015 was especially characterized by: (1) An over-representation in the proportion of first-time donors, as soon as Saturday 14 November (18% vs. 13% in the previous days and 12% in the previous week) that was even more important during the following week (20% of first-time donors) then receded quickly. (2) And an increase in the proportion of lapsing donors among whole blood donors at blood centres, rising from 11Á6% before the attacks to 20Á1% in the week following the attacks (with a peak at 26Á7% at blood centres in the day following the attacks). Table 6 illustrates this increase in the proportion of first-time and lapsing donors. The analysis of lapsing donors' behaviour at mobile drives is not provided as important biases were detected, for example an interval between two mobile collection sessions depending on the organization or location of the blood centres.
In spite of the high proportion of first-time and lapsing donors, no significant increase in the prevalence of HIV, HBV and HEV markers was noted. This is in accordance with the results of various studies, carried out after disasters such as the Bam earthquake and floods in Malaysia [11, 12] . However, the publication by Glynn et al. [7] , reported a subsequent rise in HIV, HCV and HBV sero-positivities following 11 September 2001, due to a 5Á2% increase in the number of first-time and lapsing donors.
A strong representation of young people and women among new donors was equally noticed. In normal situations, this could be partly attributed to blood collection practices in colleges or universities, which is a different configuration from a postattack context. Figs 3 and 4 , a comparison of the age pyramid of first-time donors in normal situations with the age pyramid of first-time donors after the attacks shows a relative over-representation of young people in the 20-25 age group, possibly highlighting their exceptional response to events that hit places where young people are known to congregate: restaurants, bars, Le Bataclan concert hall, etc. As soon as 14 November 2015, EFS made provision for channelling the massive flow of donors at blood drives, in a context where the level of terrorist threat remained high. The spontaneous mobilization of employees from services other than blood collection helped manage the situation.
As illustrated by
Despite very long hours of waiting, many people wanted to donate. Information on donation eligibility criteria was distributed to avoid unnecessary queuing and to promote self-exclusion. Prospective donors were invited to come back a few days later or to make a pledge.
Managing a blood donation influx requires to be able to urgently adapt organizations in order to increase collection capacities. EFS patterns of crisis management must consequently be reinforced, to better specify modalities for voluntary employees who bring punctual support in special situations. These must be defined beforehand. EFS is currently developing a specific training module on 'volunteering for crisis situations'. Arrangements to offload collection teams from peripheral tasks (welcoming donors, answering phone calls. . .) are also required to maintain a high collection rate, in compliance with safety rules. In addition, specific organization and logistic patterns must be implemented in order to increase collection capacities in the blood centres that are liable to welcome a large number of donors (adaptation of the number of whole blood collection beds, agitators, welders, adaptation of stocks of collection kits, snacks and drinks. . .).
Lower donor return rates
To assess the return rate of Paris postattack blood donors, a comparison was made with the return rates of two control populations: (1) Control population 1: donors who donated blood during the 2 weeks prior to the 2015 attacks (W44 and W45). (2) Control population 2: donors who donated blood during W47 and W48 in 2013, at the same period of time. The year 2014 was not selected as a call for urgent donation could have biased the analysis. As illustrated by Table 7 , return rates among our postattack study population proved to be lower than the return rates of the control populations. However, the gap decreases over time, with a disparity from up to 8Á2% (43Á82% vs. 52Á03%) 4 months after the attacks, to 6Á4%, 8 months later. This can be explained by a natural increase in return rates over time and by EFS's actions to retain new and lapsing donors. This trend was noticed among all donors, irrespective of age groups and profiles.
Ile-de-France blood donors being less 'loyal' than elsewhere in mainland France, a focus was made on their return rates 8 months after the attacks. The difference between this control population and the study population was only 3Á2%, that is half the value found at national level.
Return to donation after a pledge was also accurately analysed for this region: 53% of those who had made a pledge returned to donation after being called by phone. Thirty per cent of them were first-time donors. Despite this mitigated return rate, distributing pledges while facing an influx of donors is a means of avoiding overcollecting blood. It is a 'balanced compromise' as the overall first-time donors' return rate was rather high (30% vs. a proportion of 20% first-time donors as stated above).
Donor management
In addition to a 'Thank-you' campaign in the press immediately after November 13 events, every local blood centre organized donor relations actions to favour a return of first-time and lapsing donors.
Invitations to donate blood were sent to prospective donors who had come to blood drives between 14 November and 13 December 2015 and had not returned.
The most successful actions were those carried out in the first half of 2016, a period that was still 'emotionally strong'.
Reminders by phone had the most favourable outcome: 65% of the donors who were contacted came back to donate blood.
Invitations by e-mail were the least effective medium. Their action was improved when they were preceded by an e-mail to thank the donors for their generous gesture after the attacks (return rate = 16%) or when it was sent to them a short time after the attacks, as soon as they became eligible again (Return rate = 25% in January 2016).
An e-mail or SMS message, entitled 'One year ago, already', was also sent 12 months after the attacks, with a rather good impact (Return rate = 8Á5%), considering that it was distant in time.
Besides continuous blood donor relations activities, EFS carries out an annual 'Donor Barometer', an electronic satisfaction survey among blood donors that enables periodical update of our donor management strategy. In 2016, the questionnaire was sent to almost 12 000 blood donors at national level. The field investigation included an openended interview question directed to those who had donated after Paris and Nice attacks to investigate their motivations to donate blood on these specific occasions, hence a total percentage of answers exceeding 100%. The results proved instructive for future action: (1) 34% of the respondents indicated they were willing to 'commit an act of civility/solidarity' in response to the attacks. (2) 11% of them mentioned a fear of shortage/lack of blood. (3) 4% indicated that they came in response to a call for donation. (4) 2% expressed that the attacks were experienced as a stimulus for return to blood donation. Moreover: (1) 23% of these donors did not wish to answer the question; (2) 28% of them had scheduled a blood appointment for the following weeks. Of the 11 997 donors who responded to the survey, 15% indicated that they donated blood after Paris and Nice attacks (scheduled donations excluded); 54% of them were female, 46% were male.
Similar analyses were conducted among those who donated blood in Ile-de-France after Paris attack and in Alpes-M editerran ee after Nice attack. Regarding AlpesMediterran ee blood donors, the results were very close to those described above. There were nonetheless significant differences concerning Ile-de-France donors: their sex ratio was reversed compared to that observed at national level (45% female and 55% male) and the proportion of young donors was also significantly higher (42% of them were under 30 years of age and 21% belonged to the 30-39 age group).
People's willingness to help in crises and to donate blood to help face the tragedy has been widely reported in the literature [13, 14] . However, as described in reports on previous mass fatality events, casualties are usually managed with the blood that is already in stock. This extraordinary boost of generosity -stimulated by continuous calls for donation issued on 24/7 news channelsresulted in significant pressures on the whole transfusion chain, with extremely high activity peaks and a potential risk of excess blood collection, together with significant risks of blood outdating and destabilization of the medium-term blood inventory.
Communication: a critical issue in crisis situations
Postattack communication activities began during the night of 13 November and 14 November 2015 with a call for urgent blood donation issued by a blood donor association. This call was widely relayed by Internet users and taken over by the media. On Twitter, #dondusang was at the forefront of research on the Internet until November 15. Many media who wished to be informed also contacted EFS. Our switchboards were assaulted with phone calls. Web traffic congestion caused line saturation of our server on Saturday 14 November, when 175 000 connections were recorded vs. 5000 on a regular Saturday, and donor inquiries were directed to the postdonation information call centre.
To manage the situation, three press releases were issued in the main media on 14, 15 and 16 November, to express EFS compassion for the victims and notify that the need for blood was met. Blood donors were invited to come back during the following days or weeks. To emphasize the importance of blood donation year round, they were also informed that 10 000 donations are needed every day.
These messages were widely conveyed by the social networks and the news channels. EFS spokespersons also gave many interviews with the main media.
On 20 November 2015, official mails by the CEO were sent to EFS teams and to the Federation of Blood Donor Associations (FFDSB) to thank them for their commitment.
Lastly, an extensive communication campaign was launched on 23 November, to thank the blood donor community and EFS teams for their mobilization after the attacks.
These events allowed learning that, in crisis situation, it is essential to contact the media very quickly to issue precise/accurate information. Being on the lookout on social networks to identify and moderate inappropriate messages that could lead to a media buzz is another important step. So is the use of the website homepage and of an interactive voice server to immediately inform on blood needs and stock levels or issue calls for future/regular blood donations. Securing communication between our delivery facilities and emergency teams (e.g. by setting a phone line known only to hospitals) is also fundamental.
Feedback of past events underlines the need to educate people about the importance to give blood regularly. Additionally, both Paris and Nice events suggested that we must necessarily keep the main media informed about blood transfusion organization schemes and activities, blood needs, inventory management schemes but also the disadvantages associated with excess blood donations.
Effects of the massive influx of blood donors
The massive influx of donors after Paris attack immediately translated into our stock curve. Figure 5 shows the evolution of daily RBC stocks over 6 months, from 27 July 2015-27 January 2016.
In December 2015, EFS total RBC inventory exceeded 130 000 units. Never before had this level been reached, the maximum annual peak amounting to 110 000 units.
This led to an increase in RBC outdating from the 6th week following Paris attacks (starting from the 43rd day), with an average outdating level of 42Á8 RBCs per week over the subsequent 5 weeks, then of 153Á6 RBCs from the 6th to the 10th subsequent weeks). The outdating level reached after Paris attack is slightly higher than that of May and June 2015 (excluding a context of attacks). It remains low, around 2 per 1000 RBCs, compared to the outdating rates noticed after various previous mass casualty events, including 11 September 2001 when tens of thousands RBCs units had to be destroyed [15] .
An action plan was created to minimize blood outdating, based on four mechanisms. Stock rotation was implemented between local delivery facilities and between blood centres. An inventory statement was performed daily. Regular analyses of local stock forecasts were also made, to allow a uniform distribution of the national inventory. Finally, group O BPs were delivered for non-group O patients to minimize outdating on these products.
This drastic reduction of BP outdating was made possible by EFS position as a single national blood operator and by the fact that we manage virtually all LBP stocks in France. Our delivery facilities are located in hospitals, which revealed to be a major force. This specific feature of the French model enabled a careful control of all BPs, including in delivery facilities. How to improve our ability to cope with blood needs, in the context of a long-lasting threat?
Following 13 November 2015 attacks, EFS took a first step of actions, in preparation of the European football championship (Euro2016) that was held in France from 10 June to 10 July 2016: (1) National BP stocks were adapted, especially in hospitals located in cities that were to host matches and fan zones; (2) Stock levels were established on the basis of BPs usage after Paris attacks and of the flow of admitted casualties and inpatient capacities defined by hospitals; (3) IH/delivery teams were strengthened, when the most sensitive matches were played and/or in cities where risk levels were deemed high; (4) Our capacity to produce pooled platelet concentrates was surged through a broader use of 'Top and bottom' blood bags; emergency services were provided with lyophilized plasma (FLYP); (5) Logistics schemes were designed to help replenish blood stocks in the event of a crisis; (6) A kit of suitable communication tools was also created.
This plan was active when Nice attack took place. While the level of terrorist threat remains high, and in the light of experience feedback, EFS now manages hospital inventories on the basis of five parameters: (i) Number of casualties likely to be admitted; (ii) Gradual evolution of blood needs with regard to hospital inpatient capacity in crisis situation; (iii) Ability to replenish blood stocks; (iv) Control of BP outdating; (v) Important cultural events planned, to punctually adapt blood stocks. Concerning the second parameter (ii), lessons learned from both the Ile-de-France and Nice attacks provided significant information on the progression of BP needs in the aftermath of mass casualty events. The evolution of blood use after these events is provided in Tables 8  and 9 .
The last parameter (v) demands close and regular dialogues with the French Authorities, to be better prepared to manage potential future events, in close co-operation with all stakeholders.
Further resources to improve blood supply management during disasters can be found in the AABB's Disaster Operations Handbook [16] that provides a comprehensive and consistent framework of effective measures. 
Conclusion
Throughout Paris and Nice events, EFS integrated model proved to be valid and resilient, both in terms of response to blood needs and BP outdating control. Further steps will however be taken to enhance our adaptive capacity, in the light of feedback from other events, to continue addressing patient's needs.
Interaction with the media, social network information monitoring, blood donor management and human resources are key issues in crisis situations. Patient identification in the context of casualty management remains a major challenge.
Another central, emergent concern is ensuring safety and security for blood donors and collection teams on blood drives.
The interface between IH laboratories and emergency services must be secured for better prioritization of BP demands and IH testing requests.
We must be prepared to face a high level of sustained threat, while maintaining a great organizational agility.
